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THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY ARBITRATION.
A MOVEMENT has recently gained considerable headway in this
country to overturn the well settled common law rule that execu-
tory agreements to arbitrate disputes are revocable." Congress2 and
the legislatures of New York,' New Jersey,4 Massachusetts,5 and
Oregon3 have recently enacted laws designed to effect this result.7
Where such laws are in force it is no longer possible for one to enter
into a solemn agreement with another to arbitrate in case any dispute
should arise, and later, when a dispute has arisen, resort directly to
the courts, in total disregard of such agreement.
Laws of this kind are designed to make it possible to escape to some
extent three of the principal evils inherent in present day litigation.
First, the delays caused by congested court calendars, preliminary
motions and other steps which litigants may take, and the almost inevi-
table appeals. Very often the delays thus caused result in a substan-
tial denial of justice altogether.
Second, the expense of litigation.
Third, the inability of judges and juries satisfactorily to decide mat-
ters which, because of their complexity, require more consideration than
I For a full statement of the common law rule, see Red Cross "Line v. Atlan-
tic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 120, 68 L. Ed. 58, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274 (1924)
Martin v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 108, 168 Pac. 990, 991 (1917).
Act of Feb. 1-, 1925, c. 913 (43 Stats. at Large 883).
'N. Y. Laws of 1920, c. 275; Cons. Laws, c. 72.4 N. J. Laws of 1923, c. 134, p. 291.
"Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1925, c. 294.
'Ore. General Laws, 1925, c. 186, p. 279. This act is very similar to the
Washington statute (note 12 tnfra) except that it specifically provides that
where suit is brought upon a contract contaimng a provision for arbitration,
the suit shall be abated upon application.
7 In Illinois, executory agreements to arbitrate existing disputes are irre-
vocable: Ill. Laws of 1917, p. 202 (see White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296
Ill. 240, 129 N. E. 753 (1921)). But executory agreements to arbitrate disputes
which may arise m the future do not prevent immediate resort to the courts:
Cocalis -v. Nazlides, 308 II. 152, 139 N. E. 95 (1923).
In Pennsylvama, an executory contract to arbitrate prevents either party
from maintaimng an action only when the submission names the particular per-
son or tribunal to which the dispute shall be submitted. See Gowen v. Pierson,
166 Pa. St. 258, 264, 31 Atl. 83, 84 (1895), Commercial Union Assur. Co. v.
Hocking, 115 Pa. St. 407, 414 (1886) Hartupee v. Pittsburgh, 97 Pa. St. 107,
119 (1881).
Wisconsin recently passed an act much similar to the New Jersey law, but
as the provisions for making arbitration agreements irrevocable and for stay-
ing actions brought in disregard of such agreements were omitted, the act
merely outlines the procedure to be followed where both parties desire to per-
form their agreement to arbitrate. Wisc. Laws of 1923, c. 447.
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the press of litigation will permit, or matters which, because of their
technical nature, can only be adequately determined by technical men.,
Where such acts are in force business men may, by inserting a clause9
requiring arbitration in their contracts, have their disputes disposed of
promptly and inexpensively by men of their own trade or calling.10
A bill modeled upon the New Jersey arbitration law was introduced
in the Washington legislature during the last session." While it
passed in the house, it was not reached in the senate. But the passage
of such a law is not necessary in order to make available to the people
of Washington this method of settling their differences, for it has
never been possible in Washington to sue in disregard of an agreement
to arbitrate. The Arbitration Act of 1860,"2 as interpreted by the
'See "The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application," 11 A. B.
A. Joua. 153.
These defects in present-day litigation are largely responsible for the rise
of the arbitration movement. The first legislative result of this movement was
the Illinois Act of 1917 (note 7, supra). The combined efforts of the New York
State Chamber of Commerce and the New York State Bar Association resulted
in the passage of the New York Arbitration Act of 1920 (note 3, supra). See
Cohen, "The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute," 31
YALE L. Joun. 147. The New Jersey, Massachusetts, Oregon and federal acts
followed. (See notes 2-6, supra.)
The Arbitration Society of America was orgamzed in New York City in
1922 to provide facilities for arbitration and to encourage the adoption of
arbitration laws. See Wheless, "Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law," 30
W VA. L. Q., 209, 228. During 1925 the Arbitration Foundation, Inc., and the
Arbitration Conference were orgamzed to supplement the activities of the
earlier association. These three organizations have recently been merged into
a new association known as the American Arbitration Association. In Chicago
an organization called the Commerce Court of Arbitration handles a large
number of trade disputes. It has adopted a very complete set of rules of
procedure. See Greene, "Adjudication of Civil Causes by Arbitration," 4 ILL.
L. Q. 153.
A Uniform Arbitration Act was finally approved by the American Bar
Association at its annual meeting in Detroit in September, 19205, and recom-
mended to the several states for enactment. 50 Amu. BAR Ass'2r REPORTS (1925),
135-160 (for text see p. 587). This act provides for the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate existing disputes only. The matter had been before the asso-
ciation for several years, but a disagreement as to whether or not such an act
should include also future disputes had prevented the approval of any act.
Prior to this action on the part of the association it had taken the opposite
position through its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law,
which drafted the federal act. See note 2, supra; pp. 257-258, infra.
'For forms of arbitration clauses and agreements see 5 WrLnxsTo2T ox
CONTRACTS, pp. 1-8.
10 For a discussion of the extent to which arbitration is being used in Eng-
land and New York and for examples of cases recently submitted to arbitra-
tion in New York, see Grossman, "Trade Security Under Arbitration Laws,"
35 YALE L. Joua. 308 (Jan. 1926).
" House Bill No. 168. This bill was almost identical with the New Jersey
Arbitration Act (note 4, supra).
" Laws of 1860, p. 323. It was re-enacted, with slight modifications, in 1863
as sections 231-241 of the Civil Practice Act. It is now included m Remington's
Compiled Statutes as sections 420-480. The law as it exists today differs only
slightly from the law as originally enacted.
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Supreme Court, makes arbitration, or a tender thereof, where the
parties have agreed to arbitrate, a condition precedent to a cause of
action.' 3
I.
AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AS A BAR TO ANY ACTION
At Common Law.
The doctrine of the revocability of executory contracts to arbitrate
apparently originated in a dictum of Lord Coke's.14  In Vynior s
Case'" Lord Coke stated that a party might revoke the authority which
he had given arbitrators, just as he might revoke the authority of any
other agent, which would result in the parties being left with only the
courts in which to settle their differences. The contract feature of
the situation went unnoticed. In the next century the King's Bench
arrived at the same conclusion in Kill v. Hollister 16 but the court,
although it cited no authorities, seems to have realized the infirmity
in the reasoning in Vynor s Case, for it rested its decision upon the
principle that one can not contract so as to oust the courts from juris-
diction. The real explanation of these cases is probably found in Lord
Campbell's suggestion 17 that the doctrine originated "in the contests
of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction-all of them
being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of
them of jurisdiction," concerning which it has been said. "A more
unworthy genesis cannot be imagined."' 8  Forty years later, however,
Lord Kenyon reached the opposite conclusion in Halfhzde v. Fennng,49
sustaining a plea to the effect that the contract between the parties
provided for the arbitration of all differences which might arise and
that no arbitration had been had. But a few years later, m 1793,
the doctrine of the earlier cases was reaffirmed in Mitchell v. Harrs,20
and Kill v. Hollister was cited in support of the decision. Thus the
matter stood for a number of years.
This, then, was the state of the law in England at the time when
the courts of the older states in this country were first considering the
'Infra, pp. e48-254.
"For a history of this rule see Cohen, Com=Rcxim AnBmIATION AND THE
LAW (1918), and Cohen, op. cit., note 8, supra.
For a full discussion of the rule, see 3 WhV sTox ox Co2;rAcrs, §§ 1719 et
seq., 1927 et seq., 4 PAGE oX CoNxrAcTs, §§ 9527 et seq., !2546 et seq.I8 Coke 81b (K. B.), 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (1609).1I Wils. (K. B.) 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746).
"Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 853, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Tinndad Lake P Co. (D. C., N. Y.),
2X2 Fed. 1006, 1007 (1915).
'2 Bro. Ch. 336, 29 Eng. Rep. 187 (1788).
2! Ves. Jr. 129, 30 Eng. Rep. 557 (1793).
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matter and looking to English cases for their rules of decision. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the prevailing rule in the United States
is in accord with the English law as it existed at this time.
It was not long, however, before the rule began to be questioned in
England. In 1844 Lord Sugden stated2 that he believed that Half-
hide v. Fenning was still law The march to overturn the rule of
ny~zor s Case commenced with Scott v. A'ery.22  Subsequent cases,
aided no doubt by the English Arbitration Act of 1899,23 continued
the movement until the law was finally settled in England as it exists
today, namely, that one can not sue in disregard of an agreement to
arbitrate.
24
The common law rule, it should be noted, does not hold that an
executory agreement to arbitrate is void. While it can not be pleaded
in bar of an action, and will not support a motion to stay,
25 it will
support an action for damages for its breach. 26 Before penalties were
abolished this was an effective remedy, for the agreement might be
drawn up in the form of a bond for the sum which either party claimed
was due him, conditioned on abiding by the agreement to arbitrate..
2 7
But today this remedy is ineffectual because it is ordinarily impossible
to prove more than nominal damages unless, for example, expenses
have been incurred in preparation for arbitration.2 8  Nor will such
agreements be specifically enforced. 29  But once executed-that is,
where an award has been made-no action can be taken in disregard
of the awardY' If the arbitration agreement is made a rule of court,
Dimsdale v. Robertson, 2 J. & La T. 58, 92 (Irish Ch. 1844).
= Note 17, supra.
52 and 53 Vict., c. 49.
'Hamlyn k Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [1894] A. C. 20;2; Smith, Coney 4-
Barrett v. Becker Gray 4k Co., [1916] 2 Ch. 86; Stebbtng v. L. S- L. 4- G. Inv.
Co., Ltd., [1917] 2 K. B. 433; Clements v. County of Devon Ins. Co., [19181
1 K. B. 94; Woodall v. Pearl Assur. Co., Ltd., [1919] 1 K. B. 593.
'Street v. Rigby, 6 Ves. Jr. 815 (Ch.), 31 Eng. Rep. 1323 (1802) Tobey
v. County of Bristol, 3 Story 800, 819 (1845) Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377
(1868) Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422, 497 (1851) and authorities cited in
notes 1 and 14, supra.
21 Vynor's Case, note 15, supra, Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U. S. 370,
385, 34 L. Ed. 708, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133 (1890) Doleman 4- Sons v. Ossett Corp.,
[1912] 3 K. B. 257, 267, Finucane Co. v. Board of Education, 190 N. Y. 76, 83,
82 N. E. 737, 739 (1907), Miller v. Canal Co., 41 N. Y. 98 (1869).
' See Cohen, CoMatmcAL AnaiTA~io.- AND THE LAW (1918), c. 12.
' Doleman 4- Sons v. Ossett Corp., note 26, supra; Munson v. Straits of
Dover S. S. Co., 99 Fed. 787 (D. C., N. Y.), 102 Fed. 296 (C. C. A., 2d Cir.,
1900) Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671
(1899) Miller v. Canal Co., note 26, supra.
'Street v. Rigby, note 25, supra; Tobey v. County of Bristol, note 25,
supra, Cogswell v. Cogswell, 70 Wash. 178, 182, 126 Pac. 431, 432 (1912).
'Karthaus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 222 (1828) Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344
(1854) Bayne v. Morris, 1 Wall. 97 (1863). But see Taylor v. Basye, 119
Wash. 263, 205 Pac. 16 (1922) Owen v. Casey, 48 Wash. 673, 94 Pac. 473
(1908).
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no action can be brought in disregard of it.31 And where the agree-
ment provides for the submission to arbitration of incidental matters
only and makes it a condition precedent to a cause of action, leaving
the general question of liability to judicial decision, action may only
be brought after the incidental matters have been determined by the
arbitrators.
2
Various reasons have been given for the rule." Vyniors Case"4
proceeded upon the ground of the revocability of the arbitrators' author-
ity;"' this theory has been almost entirely abandoned.8 6 It has been
said that it is against public policy to enforce an agreement to forego
the right to resort to the court; 3 that the agreement to arbitrate is
collateral only ;38 and that such agreements violate the spirit of the laws
creating the courts. 9 But usually the matter is disposed of with the
simple statement that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void."40
The rule has been subject to constant attack and criticism in this
country as founded on error and followed merely because of its
antiquity.41 Serious attempts have been made to get the courts to
correct the error without legislative aid, but so far none have felt at
liberty to overturn a rule so well established.4 2
19 and 10 Wn. III, c. 15; Heckers v. Fowler 2 Wall. 123 (1864) McCann
v. Alaska Lumber Co., 71 Wash. 331, 128 Pac. 663 (1912). See Burrell v. United
States, 147 Fed. 44 (C. C. A., 9th Cir., 1906).
"Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., note 26, supra; Hamilton v. Liverpool, L. 4-
G. Ins. Co., 186 U. S. 942, 34, L. Ed. 419, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 945 (1890) Martins-
burg 4 Potomac R. R. Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549, 29 L. Ed. 255, 5 Sup. CL
Rep. 1035 (1855), Cogswell v. Cogswell, note -09, supra.
"See the able opinion of Judge Hough in United States Asphalt R. Co. v.
Trinidad Lake P Co., note 18, supra.
INote 15, supra.
'See Ore. Sav. Bank v. Am. Mtg. Co., 35 Fed. 23 (C. C., Ore., 1888),
Tobey v. County of Bristol, note 25, supra.
"See Martin v. Vansant, note 1, supra, 99 Wash., p. 117, 168 Pac., p. 994.
"'Hurst v. Litchlield, note 25, supra; Prince Steamship Co. v. Lehman, 39
Fed. 704, 5 L. R. A. 464 (D. C., N. Y., 1889).
" Hamilton v. Home Ins. co., note 26, supra; Dawson v. Fitzgerald, 1 Ex.
D. 257 (C. A., 1876).
"Meacham v. Jamestown F 4: C. R. R. Co., 911 N. Y. 346, 105 N. R. 653
(1914).
0Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451 (1874) Perlns v. U. S. Elec-
tric Light Co., 16 Fed. 513 (C. C., N. Y., 1881). See Guaranty Trust, etc., Co.
v. Green Cove, etc., B. Co., 139 U. S. 137, 35 L. Ed. 116, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 519
(1891).
"* U S. Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P Co., note 18, supra; Atlantic
Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 976 Fed. 319 (D. C., N. Y., 1921) Aktieselskabet
Korn, etc., v. Redertaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 Fed. 935, 939 (C. C. A., 2d Cir.,
1918), D. ." H. Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N. Y. 257 (1872).
"Ibid. And see Berkovitz v. Arbib I Houlberg, 030 N. Y. 261, 276, 130
N. E. 288, 292 (19-1).
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In Washington.
The provisions of the Washington statutes which the Supreme Court
thought overturned the common law rule and made arbitration a con-
dition precedent to a cause of action are as follows :4
"All persons desirous to end, by arbitration, any contro-
versy, suit, or quarrel, except such as respect the title to real
estate, may submit their difference to the award or umpirage
of any person or persons mutually selected.
"Said agreement to arbitrate shall be in writing, signed by
the parties, and may be by bond in any sum, conditioned that
the parties entering into said submission shall abide by the
award."
There is nothing in this language requiring that the common law
rule be overturned. In other states where similar provisions are in
force they have not been interpreted as effecting this result.44
There is no decision in the early Washington reports specifically
interpreting these provisions as changing the pre-existing law B,,t
from the first the court recognized that the Washington rule differed
from that in effect elsewhere. In a case in the fifth volume of the
Washington reports 45 the court referred to the fact that the statute
was peculiar and that the court could "get but little aid from the cita-
tion of authorities." 46  A few years later a defendant set up an arbitra-
tion agreement as a plea in bar and apparently would have prevailed
had the dispute in question been included in the agreement, for the
court said that "courts will enforce contracts to arbitrate disputes and
make the decision of arbitrators final" where this is dearly the intention,
but that where such intention is not clear the courts will construe the
agreement "in favor of the right to resort to the courts for redress in
the usual manner.' 47
Hughes v. Bravinder48 is the first case enforcing arbitration as a
" Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 420, 4-21.
14 Most states have some sort of statutory provision applying to arbitration.
See 3 WILLISTON ON CoNTa~cTs, § 1930; Grossman, op. cit. note 10, supra, p.
323. In all of these states the common law rule is apparently in effect. 3 WIL
LISTON oN CoN.raMArs, § 1721, 4 PAGE ON CoxTaAcTs, §§ 2527, 2546. The statutes
in some states specifically recognize the right to revoke an executory agreement
to arbitrate. See Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., § 1290; N. Y Code of Civ. Proc.,
§ 2383, Civil Practice Act, § 1466 (now repealed by the Arbitration Act, note 3,
supra.)
' Tacoma R. 8S M. Co. v. Cummings, 5 Wash. 206, 207, 31 Pac. 747, 33 Pac.
507, 508 (1892).
41 See also Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374
(1901), where the court refused to go into the decisions of other states for aid
in deciding a question involving the law of arbitration.
" Van Horne v. Watrous 10 Wash. 525, 527, 39 Pac. 136 (1895).
' 9 Vash. 595, 38 Pac. 209 (1894) 14 Wash. 304, 44 Pac. 536 (1896).
SETTLEMENT BY ARBITRATION
condition precedent, but neither the common law rule nor the statute
was referred to by the court. This case grew out of a building con-
tract which provided that the owner's superintendent should decide all
matters of performance, extras, and "the amount of damages which
may accrue from any cause," and declared his "decision on all matters
to be finding and conclusive to all parties concerned." The contractor
sued for the balance of the contract price still due, for extras, and for
damages. Upon the first appeal the court reversed the trial court's
action in dismissing the suit and granted a new trial upon the ground
that the plaintiff should halve been given judgment for the balance due
on the purchase price, over which there was no dispute, and for those
extras and damages which had been allowed by the superintendent.
Upon the second appeal the court sustained the action of the trial court
in dismissing the suit without prejudice to further proceedings before
the superintendent, because it appeared from the evidence that the
plaintiff had broken up and prevented further hearings before the
superintendent when the defendant commenced to introduce evidence
in support of his claim for damages.
The next case, Zindorf Construction Co. v. Western Amerzcan
Co., 49 was the first to refer to the statute or to cite any authorities.
This case arose out of a contract which contained the following arbitra-
tion provision: 9
"The superintendent of the party of the first part (the
defendant) is hereby constituted an arbitrator, to whom shall
be submitted any dispute arising out of this agreement, or
the performance thereof; and his word in the matter shall be
final, conclusive, and without appeal therefrom."
Disputes arose between the parties, and the plaintiff brought suit.
The defendant appeared and demurred to the complaint. Thereafter
the defendant served a notice of arbitration upon the plaintiff. The
latter refused to join in the arbitration. Thereupon, the defendant
proceeded to present its case to the arbitrator, obtained an award and
had judgment entered in accordance with the statutory procedure.
The defendant then filed a motion in the action commenced by the
plaintiff, asking that the suit be dismissed. This motion was granted
by the trial court, and its action was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme
Court in its opinion referred to the statute and the previous cases on
the subject, and said:"'
"There can be no mistake as to the meaning of the words.
No ambiguity or uncertainty can be attributed to them. There
' Note 46, supra.
-027 Wash. p. 32, 67 Pac. p. 374.7 Wash. pp. 38, 41, 67 Pac. pp. 376, 377.
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was a plain, solemn agreement to submit matters in dispute
arising out of said contract to an arbitrator. The matters
involved in this suit arose directly out of that contract. The
court found that appellant commenced this action without
even demanding or offering to arbitrate the matters in dis-
pute, and that it has never at any time before or since the
bringing of the action offered to arbitrate or demanded the
same. Is the appellant, notwithstanding such failure to de-
mand an arbitration, entitled to maintain this suit?
All questions of public policy as to the propriety of arbitra-
tion seem to have been already resolved in this state, both by
the legislature and by the courts, in favor of recognizing it
as a method by which disputing parties may settle their
differences.
CC The demurrer to the amended complaint, if it
had been passed upon, should have been sustained for failure to
show an effort to arbitrate, or a refusal on the part of the
arbitrator, but since the demurrer was never passed upon, and
the court tried the question of fact upon the motion to dismiss,
the same result was reached."
The leading Washington case on the irrevocability of arbitration
contracts is Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co.5" The
contract out of which the dispute in this case arose contained the fol-
lowing arbitration clause :5
"Any dispute which may arise between the parties hereto
shall be left to the decision of a board of arbitrators.
The decision of a majority of this board shall be final
and both parties hereto agree to accept such decision of a
majority as final and binding."
A dispute arose and the plaintiff brought suit. At the close of the
plaintiff's case the defendant moved for a non-suit upon the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to show any offer of or demand for arbi-
tration.54  The trial court overruled the motion and gave judgment
for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The court, in reversing the
decision of the trial court, said:"
"Of the errors assigned, the only one we find it necessary
to notice is the refusal of the court to grant the motion for
non-suit. The refusal to grant this motion we think was
error. We have held in a long line of cases that, where
parties enter into a contract, and provide therein that all
'81 Wash. 592, 142 Pac. 1153 (1914).
81 Wash. p. 593, 142 Pac. p. 1153.
Apparently this objection was raised for the first time by this motion.
It does not appear to have been raised in the answer. See 81 Wash. p. 594, 142
Pac. p. 1154.
81 Wash. p. 595, 14- Pac. p. 1154.
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differences between them that may thereafter arise out of the
contract shall be submitted to a board of arbitrators whose
decision therein shall be conclusive and final upon the parties,
no action can be maintained on the contract by either party
until he has tendered arbitration of the differences to the
other party, and such other party has refused the tender." 5a
Dickie Manufacturing Co. v. Sound Construction & Engineering
Co.5 7 is a case of importance in this connection not only because of the
decision, but also because of the dicta and review of cases contained in
the opinion. In this case controversies had arisen between the parties
and they had signed an arbitration agreement by which each party was
to appoint an arbitrator, and the two thus appointed were to select a
third. The arbitrators were appointed and hearings commenced.
After a number of hearings had been had the plaintiff's arbitrator
withdrew, and the plaintiff refused to appoint a successor, announcing
that it was no longer bound. Thereafter the plaintiff brought suit
on its claims. The two remaining arbitrators proceeded with the
hearings and made an award. This award was filed, and judgment
entered thereon in accordance with the statutory procedure. Plaintiff
then brought this suit to set aside the award on the ground of mis-
conduct on the part of the arbitrators. Defendant demurred. The
trial court sustained the demurrer, and its decision was affirmed bn
appeal. The court, after discussing the subject generally and review-
ing the previous cases, said :i8
"That common law arbitration was excluded by our statute
is plain. For instance, either party under the former could
repudiate the proceedings before an award was actually re-
turned, and even afterwards, should he refuse to pay it, there
was nothing left the prevailing party but to bring a suit upon
it. Both these burdensome rights are in express terms swept
away, for the statute makes the arbitration a preliminary
part of judicial hearing, the award in a sense automatically
passing into judgment unless the losing party can persuade
the court to modify or set it aside."
' It was also argued that the defendant had wrongfully violated the status
quo and hence that the plaintiff should not be compelled to resort to arbitra-
tion before bringing suit. See Winsor -v. German Say. 4t Loan Soc., 31 Wash.
365, 72 Pac. 66 (1903). The court overruled this contention, stating that
whether the defendant's acts were wrongful or not was the very matter in
dispute. The court suggested that if it were made to appear that the defend-
ant's acts would result in depriving the plaintiff of the fruits of Ins award
should he prevail, the court might in a proceeding ancillary to the arbitration
proceedings take such steps as might be found necessary to preserve the prop-
erty in dispute pending the termination of the arbitration proceedings. It would
seem that this case overruled the Winsor case, supra.
1192 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916).
92 Wash. p. 319, 159 Pac. p. 131.
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Later on in the opinion, the court, in discussing some of the previous
cases, said :59
"Those who enter into arbitration accept in advance the
jurisdiction of the superior court. The board is a prelimi-
nary, voluntarily created tribunal or referee, and the juris-
diction of the superior court is first to be exerted in a revisory
capacity and only when appealed to by exceptions. If it can
not adequately correct errors on the exceptions, it may take
the whole controversy over and proceed without a jury
Common law arbitration has ceased to exist. If there is no
proper agreement under the statute, then there is no arbitra-
tion at all. But once the parties do properly agree on arbi-
tration, there can be no revocation."
The rule of the earlier cases was reaffirmed in the recent case of
Jackson v. Walla Walla.60  This case grew out of a contract which
contained an arbitration clause. A dispute having arisen, the plaintiff,
instead of continuing operations and appealing to a board of arbitra-
tion as required in the contract, abandoned performance and brought
suit. The defendant answered denying liability, and set up a counter-
claim for damages, alleging a breach of contract by the plaintiff. At
the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant withdrew its counterclaim
and moved for a nonsuit which was granted. This action was affirmed
upon appeal. The court said :61
"The appeal provided for is to a board of arbitration, and
by article 9 it is emphatically stated and agreed that such
arbitration is intended to avoid litigation and shall be a condi-
tion precedent to any action at law by either party under the
contract.
"Such contracts are enforceable."
After quoting from North Ooavt R. Co. v. Kraft Co.63" as follows:
"Where a contract provides for a method of adjusting all
differences that may arise between the parties, that method
must be pursued before either party can resort to the courts
for an adjustment,"
the court said:63
"Certainly the rule applies in this case where the contract
goes further than those in the cases just cited and provides
that arbitration shall be a condition precedent to any action
at law"
9f2 Wash. p. 821, 159 Pac. p. 132.
130 Wash. 96, 226 Pac. 487 (1924).
6130 Wash. p. 100, 226 Pac. p. 488.
63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97 (1911).
130 Wash. p. 101, 226 Pac. p. 488.
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There are three cases which, while recognizing the rule under dis-
cussion, hold that the agreement to arbitrate did not bar plaintiff's
suit. In Calhoun, Denny & Ewing v. Pederson6 4 the court held that
where the defendant had totally abandoned the contract in which the
arbitration agreement was included, it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to tender arbitration.65 The court placed its decision upon
the familiar rule that tender is unnecessary where it is clear that it
will not be accepted if made. In Gile v. Tsutakawa,6r where the
contract called for arbitration of "any dispute arising as to the proper
fulfillment of the contract," the court held that the dispute which had
arisen was not one concerning the "fulfillment" of the contract and
hence was not within the arbitration clause.67  And in McNeff v.
Capistran,68 where the contract gave each party the "privilege of
selecting an arbitrator" the court held that the language of the arbitra-
tion clause was not sufficient to show that the parties intended to make
arbitration a condition precedent to a cause of action.69
There are two cases in which the opinions indicate that the court
considered that the common law rule was in effect in Washington. 7
But as the question was not directly involved in either, they cannot
be considered as affecting the cases discussed abolve. Moreover, the
court has twice stated that common law arbitration no longer exists
in Washington. 71 Common law appraisal, however, is still in effect.72
'85 Wash. 630, 149 Pac. 25 (1915).
I See also The Atlanten, -52 U. S. 313, 315, 64 L. Ed. 586, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep.
332 (1920) Xurezdini v. National British, etc., Ins. Co., Ltd., [1915] A. C. 499.
But if the submission names the arbitrators or board, or for any other
reason no action is necessary on the part of the defendant in order to select
the arbitrators, there seems to be no reason why the plaintiff in such a case
should not be required to proceed before the arbitrators. The defendant's
failure to perform the contract should not remove the conditions upon the
plaintiff's right to resort to the courts. See 3 WixusToi oXr CoNTRAcTs, § 1720.
And it would seem that this would be more satisfactory to the plaintiff, for
arbitration could be had and judgment obtained in a comparatively short time.
1109 Wash. 366, 187 Pac. 323 (1920).
"But the soundness of this decision may be questioned. The dispute arose
over whether or not the defendant, who had purchased goods, had fulfilled his
part of the bargain by paying the price called for in the contract. The deter-
mination of this question depended upon the meamng of certain words found
in the contract.
120 Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 14 (1902).
C An examination of the entire arbitration clause involved in this case
makes it seem likely that the parties intended to require arbitration, and only
used the word "privilege" in connection with the selection of arbitrators. But
perhaps it was not clear enough to warrant barring the parties from resorting
to the courts.
"i Martin v. Vansant, note 1, supra; Cogswel v. Cogswell, note 29, supra.
' Dickte Mfg. Co. v. Sound Oonst. 8, Eng. Co., note 57, supra; Suksdorf
v. Suksdorf, 93 Wash. 667, 161 Pac. 465 (1916).
"Martin v. Vansant, note 1, supra; Peterson v. Grauger Irrigation District,
38 Wash. Dec. 21, 243 Pac. 847 (Mar. 4, 1926).
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Agreements to arbitrate must have consideration."3  They must
definitely indicate what matters are to be arbitrated, and the dispute
which has arisen must clearly fall within the description, for a con-
struction in favor of the right to resort to the courts will be adopted.
7 4
Where these requirements are fulfilled, the cases just discussed show
that the Washington courts will enforce arbitration. But, of course,
the agreement to arbitrate may be abandoned by mutual consent. "
In the Federal Courts.
In the federal courts the common law rule is in effect. 6 Conse-
quently actions may be commenced in the federal courts in disregard
of existing agreements to arbitrate.7 7 And this is true even though
the federal court is sitting in a state where the common law rule has
been abrogated and is considering an arbitration agreement made and
to be performed in such a state.7 8 Accordingly in two cases which
arose in the District Court for the Western District of Washington
involving contracts made and to be performed in Washington, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit held that an action
might be maintained in the District Court although the contracts con-
tained arbitration clauses.79 The court stated that the common law
Barnes v. Spurck, 191 Wash. 338, 909 Pac. 513, 919 Pac. 583 (1992).
Van Home v. Watrous, note 47, supra, Klock Produce Co. v. Robertson,
90 Wash. 960, 155 Pac. 1044 (1916) Russell 4- Gallagher v. Yesler Estate, 89
Wash. 960, 154t Pac. 188 (1916).
ngvall v. Buchie, 73 Wash. 534, 139 Pac. 931 (1913).
It would seem that where one party to an arbitration agreement disregards
it and commences suit, and the other appears generally and answers to the
merits, the parties have "elected to settle their disputes not by arbitration
but in a court of law." See Zimmerman v. Cohen, 936 N. Y 15 139 N. E. 764
(1923) McNeff v. Capistran, note 68, supra. But see Herring-Hall-Marvin
Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., notes 59, 54, supra, and Jackson v. Walla Walla,
note 60, supra, in each of which cases the defendant first set up the arbitration
agreement as a bar at the close of the plaintiff's case, having answered to the
merits, and the court entered a nonsuit. In the Jackson case the defendant
had set up a counterclaim but withdrew it in accordance with a stipulation
between the parties before moving for the nonsuit.
" Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., note 1, supra, and cases cited in
the following three footnotes. See also Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., note 96,
supra, Insurance Co. v. Morse, note 40, supra.
' United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P Co., note 18, supra;
Aktieselskabet Korn, etc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, note 41, supra; and
cases cited in notes 78, 79, snfra.
"SMitchell v. Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639 (C. C. A., 3d Cir., 1898) and cases
cited in the following note. See Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Bierce .Sage, 183
Fed. 588 (C. C., Mich., 1910).
"Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 989 Fed. 405 (19:3) Tatsuuma
Kisen Kabushik% v. Prescott, 4 Fed. (2d) 670 (1925).
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rule is "the established law in the courts of the United States, from
which the inferior federal courts are not at liberty to depart."80
As the Washington Supreme Court has established the rule that
arbitration is a condition precedent to a cause of action,81 it might
seem that where suit is brought on a contract containing an arbitration
clause governed by the law of Washington there is no right created
which can be the basis of an action in a federal court or in any other
court until arbitration is had or tendered. Such a contention was
made in a case82 brought in a federal court in New York. The con-
tract there involved was governed by the laws of Denmark or Sweden,
in both of which countries arbitration is a condition precedent to a
cause of action. Judge Learned Hand disposed of this contention as
follows :s
"Such clauses, if regarded as conditions precedent to any
action, have, I believe, nearly always been held to touch the
remedy, and not the right They do not affect to
touch the obligation of the parties, as surely they do not; they
prescribe how the parties must proceed to obtain any redress
for their wrongs, which covers only remedies. In one sense
everything which touches the remedy touches the obligation,
since the only sanction to performance rests in the remedy;
but that is the speech of philosophers, not of lawyers, among
whom the distinction has arisen and is real."
That this question is one of remedy and is governed by the law of
the forum seems to be well established.8 4  Thus it is stated by Judge
Cardozo :85
"An agreement that all defenses arising under a contract
shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of reme-
dies, and the law that governs remedies is the law of the
forum."
And that it is one of general law upon which the federal courts do
not follow the decisions of the highest court of the state in which they
I Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushlik v. Prescott, note 79, supra, pp. 672-673.
'See pp. 948-251, supra.
,2Aktieselskabet Korn, etc. v, Redertaktiebolaget Atlanten, 231 Fed. 403(1916).
SIbid., p. 405.
The Eros, 241 Fed. 186, 191 (D. C., N. Y., 1916) Atlantic Fruit Co. v.
Red Cross Line, note 41, supra; United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad
Lake P Co., note 18, supra; Aktieselskabet Korn, etc. v. Redernaktiebolaget
Atlanten, note 82, supra.
I Meacham v. Jameston, P t C. R. R. Co., note 39, supra, 211 N. Y. p.
500, 105 N. E. p. 655.
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happen to be sitting is equally well established."6 Accordingly it has
been stated .87
"The question being one of general law, the decisions of
the Court of Appeals of the state of New York are not bind-
ing upon the Federal Courts."
That the rule is understood by the Washington Supreme Court to
be one of remedy is indicated by the opinion in Dzckie Manufacturing
Co. v. Sound Construction & Engineering Co.
8
The United States Supreme Court may, however, when next called
upon to decide this question, overturn the common law rule. In the
last few years the lower federal courts have criticized the rule severely
and have indicated clearly that they would no longer follow it if the
decisions of the Supreme Court were not binding upon them.89 That
this criticism of the rule and the growing movement to overturn it
have not been without effect upon the Supreme Court is indicated by
statements appearing in two recent cases. 90 In one of them Mr. Justice
Holmes stated :91
"With regard to the arbitration clause we shall not con-
sider the general question whether a greater effect should
"'Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross L2ne, note 41, supra, United States
Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P Co., note 18, supra.
'Aktieselskabet Korn, etc. v. Redertaktiebolaget Atlanten, note 41, supra,
250 Fed. p. 937.
1 Note 57. supra. See pp. 251-952, supra.
Judge Hough in United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P Co.,
note 18, supra, stated (922 Fed. pp. 1011, 1012) "Neither the Legislature of
New York nor Congress has seen fit thus to modermze the ideas of the judges
of their respective jurisdictions. I think the decisions cited show
beyond question that the Supreme Court has laid down the rule that such a
complete ouster of jurisdiction as is shown by the clause quoted from the
charter parties is void in a federal forum. It was within the power of that
tribunal to make this rule. Inferior courts may fail to find convincing reasons
for it; but the rule must be obeyed, and these motions be severally denied."
The same judge in a concurring opinion in Aktieselskabet Korn, etc. v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, note 41, supra, stated (250 Fed. p. 939) "As
to clause 21, it is undeniable that American authority is at present as stated
in the court's opinion; whether the rule as given can long survive historical and
logical criticism, I venture to doubt."
Judge Mack in Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, note 41, supra,
stated (276 Fed. p. 322) "I recognize the growing sentiment in the commercial
world, which is principally concerned in these matters, that the law ought not
to intervene and render arbitration agreements ineffective (see Cohen, Cox-
HEacIAL AnaaiATio.N AND THE LAW), and the duty of the courts, especially in
matters essentially of procedure, to free themselves from anachronistic rules
and precedents which are opposed to principles and standards of modern
jurisprudence."
"The Atlanten, note 65, supra; Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
note 1, supra.
01 The Atlanten, note 65, supra, 259 U. S. p. 315.
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not be given to such clauses than formerly was done, since
it is not necessary to do so in order to decide the case be-
fore us."
And in the other Mr. Justice Brandeis stated :92
"As the constitutionality of the remedy provided by New
York for use in its own courts is not dependent upon the
practice or procedure which may prevail in admiralty, we
have no occasion to consider whether the unwillingness of the
federal courts to give full effect to executory agreements for
arbitration can be justified."
Under the United States Arbitration Act.
The United States Arbitration Act, 93 approved by the President
February 12, 1925, went into effect on January 1st of this year. It
applies only to maritime contracts and to contracts involving interstate
or foreign commerce. Agreements to arbitrate disputes, existing and
future, arising out of such contracts are declared to be "valid, irre-
vocable and enforceable."
The act further provides that where a suit has been brought in a
federal court involving a maritime or interstate (or foreign) commerce
contract, the court shall stay proceedings when either party makes it
appear that arbitration had been agreed upon between them. Or, in
case no action has been commenced, a party to such a contract may,
provided the federal court would ordinarily have jurisdiction over the
controversy, petition the court for an order directing the other party
to arbitrate. In case the making of the agreement to arbitrate or the
failure to perform it is denied, the court is to hear the matter immedi-
ately, allowing a jury trial if demanded, and determine that issue.
If resolved against the party raising it, the court shall direct that the
parties proceed with their arbitration. In maritime matters the pro-
ceedings may be commenced by libel or seizure of the property involved
as formerly; the court shall then direct the parties to proceed to arbi-
trate the dispute in accordance with their agreement. Provision is
made for the selection of an arbitrator by the court under certain cir-
cumstances, for the summoning of -witnesses by the arbitrators, for
entering judgment upon. the award, and for objecting to and correcting
the award.
Of course, the act has not yet been the subject of judicial interpreta-
'Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., note 1, supra, 264 U. S. p. 125.
1 Note 2, supra.
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tion. It was carefully drawn, however, and, as it is very similar to
the New York act which has been approved by the United States
Supreme Court,94 it will probably stand the test of constitutionality.
The act is broad enough to apply to actions commenced in state
courts as well as to those instituted in federal courts, and it was so
intended by those who drafted it. 5  It was recognized, however, that
it might be held that Congress could not so regulate procedure in the
state courts even though maritime and interstate commerce matters
were involved.9 Consequently, the act was so drafted that such a
decision would not affect its application to the federal courts.
II.
THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE AwARD.
It is just as vital, if arbitration is to be of any use to the business
world as a means of settling disputes, that awards be upheld when
made, as it is that agreements to arbitrate be enforced. If the courts
are disposed to pry into awards and examine them with critical eyes,
then arbitration becomes, as those opposed to its use contend, just
another step in a course of litigation already too lengthy and costly
Section 3 of the Washington Arbitration Act 97 provides that the
award after having been signed and sealed up by the arbitrators and
delivered to the prevailing party shall be filed with the clerk of the
Superior Court, and if no exceptions are filed against it within twenty
days, "judgment shall be entered as upon the verdict of a jury, and
execution may issue thereon, and the same proceedings (may be had)
upon said award, with like effect as though said award were a verdict
in a civil action." And Section 598 provides:
"The party against whom an award may be made may
except in writing thereto for either of the following causes:
"Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., note 1, supra.
"The act was drafted by the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law of the American Bar Association. See "The United States Arbi-
tration Law and Its Application," 11 A. B. A. Jou. 153, an article written
by the committee just mentioned.
"1 For cases bearing on the question of whether Congress may thus regulate
procedure in the state courts, see Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U. S. 197, 333, 48 L. Ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436 (1904) Board of Trade
v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 67 L. Ed. 839, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 470 (1923) Am. Express
Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 143, 49 L. Ed. 417, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182 (1905).
Rem. Comp. Stat., § 422.
Rem. Comp. Stat., § 494.
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"1. That the arbitrators or umpire misbehaved themselves
in the case;
"2. That they committed an error in fact or law;
"3. That the award was procured by corruption or other
undue means."
The Washington Supreme Court decided at an early day that in
proceedings arising out of exceptions to an award the Superior Court
should not try the matter de novo on the evidence submitted to the
arbitrators, but may look only to the award and submission to discover
errors of fact or law.
This question was first treated comprehensively in School District v.
Sage."9 In that case the court said:100
"The argument of the learned counsel for appellant, as
indicated by their brief, seems to proceed upon the theory that
this court will try and determine the matters in controversy
between these parties upon the evidence which was submitted
to the arbitrators and which has been transmitted to this
court as part of the record herein. But such is not the theory
of the law. With the merits of the controversy the
court had nothing whatever to do."
Upon the question as to how the court was to determine whether
errors of fact or law had been committed the court said :101
"If it was the intention of the legislature to require the
court, upon hearing exceptions taken to awards, to examine
the evidence submitted to the arbitrators, or, in other words,
to try the cause de novo, it is but reasonable to presume that
they would have so declared. And in the absence of such pro-
vision, we think we are justified in adopting the rule an-
nounced in many well considered cases, and which we believe
is subject to but few exceptions, viz., that the errors and
mistakes contemplated by the statute must appear on the face
of the award, or, at least, in some paper delivered with it."
A few years later the question of considering errors which did not
appear from the face of the award or submission again came before the
court in Skagit County v. Trowbridge."'2 In this case the arbitrator
had filed, along with the submission and award, a transcript of the
testimony taken before him and findings of fact and conclusions of law
13 Wash. 352, 43 Pae. 341 (1896).
'" Ibid., 13 Wash. p. 355, 43 Pac. p. 342.
' Ibid., 13 Wash. p. 356, 43 Pac. p. 342.
'125 Wash. 140, 64 Pac. 901 (1901).
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The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Superior Court in refusing
to consider anything except the submission and award in seeking to
discover errors of fact or law And in the recent case of Hatch v.
Cole,' the court reaffirmed its early holding that it would not go into
the merits of the case or consider errors of fact or law except such
as appeared on the face of the submission or award.
III.
THE SUBMISSION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREUNDER.
Any disputes, except such as relate to the title of real estate,'0 4 may
be submitted to arbitration in Washington.i The arbitration agree-
ment or submission must be in writing and signed by the parties
thereto, 1 and may be in the form of a bond, but this is not indis-
pensable.10 7  It may be included as a clause in a contract or other
instrument, 08 or it may consist of a separate document.'0 9 It may
provide for any and all disputes which may arise out of certain con-
tracts between the parties," or it may include only certain specified
disputes."' It may apply to an existing dispute as well as to a future
dispute.' It is not necessary to refer to the statute in the agreement;
as common law arbitration no longer exists in Washington, any agree-
ment for arbitration will be considered to have been made under the
'o'128 Wash. 107, 222 Pac. 463 (1924).
A dispute over the possession of real estate may be arbitrated: Taylor
v. Basye, note 30, supra.
"I Rem. Comp. Stat., § 420.
106 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 491. But see McElroy v. Hooper 70 Wash. 347
16 Pac. 925 (1912), where an award was held to be valid and enforceable
although not preceded by any written submission.
... Dickze Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. 8 Bng. Co., note 57, supra.
0I See Hughes v. Bravinder note 48, supra; Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western
Am. Co., note 46, supra; Herrng-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co.,
note 52, supra.
"0'See School District -v. Sage, note 99, supra; Dickte Mfg. Co. v. Sound
Const. ck Eng. Co., note 57, supra; Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
11 Van Hook v. Burns, 10 Wash. 22, 38 Pae. 763 (1894) Zindorf Const.
Co. ). Western Am. Co., note 46, supra; Winsor v. German Say. 4- Loan Soc.,
note 56, supra; Herrng-Hall-Marwn Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., note .52,
supra; Mitsubishi Gosh, Katsha v. Carstens Packing Co., 116 Wash. 630, 200
Pac. 327 (19-1).
"I School District v. Sage, note 99, supra, Jordan v. Lobe, 34 Wash. 42,
74 Pac. 817 (1904). See also Calhoun, Denny 0 Ewing v. Pederson, note 64,
supra.
"School District v. Sage, note 99, supra, Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const.
- Eng. Co., note 57, supra, Suksdorf v. Suksdorf note 71, supra; Hatch V.
Cole, note 103, supra.
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statute unless it fails to comply therewith, in which case there is no
arbitration at all. 18 The intention to require arbitration of the dis-
pute which has arisen must be clear.114 It is not necessary to provide
that the parties will abide by the award when made; this will be
implied.1
The agreement may provide for only one arbitrator,11 6 or for any
number. 17  The arbitrator or arbitrators may be named in the agree-
ment.1 8 It is customary, however, to provide that one arbitrator be
selected by each party and that the two thus selected shall choose a
third, or that such third arbitrator shall be selected only in case the
first two can not agree on an award." 9
Many things in connection with the conduct of the arbitration may
be regulated in advance in the arbitration agreement. 20 Among
others, it is possible to limit the time within which an award is to be
rendered.' 2' After this time has expired the arbitrators' authority is
gone and the parties are at liberty to resort to the courts. 21 But this
time limit may be waived.' 2 3
"S uksdorf v. Suksdorf, note 71, supra.
'", Van Horne v. Watrous, note 47, supra; Russell Gallagher v. Yesler
Estate, note 74, supra. See Klock Produce Co. v. Robertson, note 74, supra.
"'Suksdorf v. Suksdorf, note 71, supra.
"'6Rem. Comp. Stat, §420; Hughes v. Bravwnder note 48, supra; Van
Hook v. Burns, note 110, supra; Skagit- County v. Trowbridge, note 102, supra;
Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co., note 46, supra.
" Rem. Comp. Stat, § 420; and cases cited in note 119, infra.
m Suksdorf v. Suksdorf note 71, supra; Mdtsubishi Goshi Katsha v. Car-
stens Packing Co., note 110, supra.
'"Jordan v. Lobe, note 111, supra; Cogswell v. Cogswell, note 29, supra;
Herrng-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., note 52, supra; Dickte Mfg.
Co. v. Sound Const. Eng. Co., note 57, supra; McNe/f v. Capistran, note 68,
supra.
It is probably more advisable to have both parties agree upon all the
arbitrators. See Grossman, op. cit. note 10, supra, where it is stated (p. 320).
"Under the rules of the Arbitration Society of America, both parties to a
dispute are urged to agree on all of the arbitrators in a given case; in other
words, the one, three or more arbitrators who are to hear the evidence and
render the award, should represent both parties and thus be able to approach
their task with a judicial mind. Under the rules of certain trade organiza-
tions, however, each side is permitted to select its own arbitrator, and the two
then agree upon a third, who is the umpire; in this manner each side really
has its own advocate on the arbitration board rather than an impartial
arbitrator."
12 Dickte Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. 4k Eng. Co., note 57, supra. In tis case
it is stated that only those things can be so regulated as can be the subject of
a stipulation in the Superior Court.
"'Bachelder v. Wallace, 1 Wash. T. 107 (1860), Jordan v. Lobe, note 111,
supra; Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. k Eng. Co., note 57, supra. See Lidger-
wood Park Waterworks Co. v. Spokane, 19 Wash. 365, 53 Pac. 352 (1898).
' Jordan v. Lobe, note 111, supra.
'Bachelder v. Wallace, note 121, supra; Jordan v. Lobe, note 111, supra.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
After a dispute has arisen between the parties to a contract which
contains an arbitration clause, a demand for arbitration should be
made by the party desiring to proceed. This demand should be served
upon the opposite party, not upon his attorney 124 If the opposite
party refuses to join in the arbitration, the other may, in cases in
which the selection of the arbitrators does not depend upon the acts of
both parties, proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the agree-
ment and have judgment entered as provided by statute.1 2 ' But in
cases where the agreement makes it necessary for each party to act in
order to select the arbitrators, the party demanding arbitration can
only resort to the courts if arbitration is refused. 12 6  It is not necessary,
however, to tender arbitration when the opposite party has wholly
abandoned his contract; suit may be commenced at once.1 27  Resort to
the courts may also be had in case the arbitrator selected refuses to
act,' 28 or if two arbitrators are unable to select a third where this is
required. 12
9
It is probable that upon the proper showing, a party may, on com-
mencing arbitration proceedings, resort to the courts in a proceeding
ancillary thereto for an order preserving the status quo pending the
termination of the arbitration proceedings.2 0
Almost anyone may be appointed an arbitrator.' Ordinarily a
party cannot act as an arbitrator, nor can others interested in the out-
come of the arbitration." 2  Inadequacy of an award will be considered
as evidence of interest.' 3 But the right to object to the appointment
of such persons is waived by a failure to object within a reasonable
time after obtaining knowledge of the facts.'3 4
' McNeff v. Capistran, note 68, supra.
'Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co., note 46, supra, Mitsubishi
Gosht Katsha v. Carstens Packing Co., note 110, supra.
'
2 See Winsor v. German Say. i Loan Soc., note 56, supra; Calhoun,
Denny . Ewing v. Pederson, note 64, supra.
Under the modern arbitration acts, however, an action may be commenced
to compel the opposite party to arbitrate, and either party may at any time
apply to the court for the appointment of an arbitrator where for any reason
there is a vacancy. See statutes cited in notes -2 to 5, supra.
Calhoun, Denny Rwzng v. Pederson, note 64, supra.
Russell k Gallagher v. Yesler Estate, note 74, supra.
Cogswell v. Cogswell, note 29, supra, Richardson v. Harkness, 59 Wash.
474, 110 Pac. 9 (1910).
.. See Herrzng-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., note 52, supra.
.
3 See State ex rel. Noble v. Bowlby, 74 Wash. 54, 130 Pac. 7293 (1913).
1 Glover v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 143, 39 Pac. 380 (1895)
(but see Dickio Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. l Eng. Co., note 57, supra, as to
this case) Klock Produce Co. v. Robertson, note 74, supra.
3 Glover v. Rochester German Ins. Co., note 132, supra.
" State ex rel. Noble v. Bowlby, note 131, supra.
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The arbitration proceedings and the award must comply with the
terms of the submission, 3" but a substantial compliance is sufficient. 386
It is not necessary to proceed with the formality of a court,3 7 nor are
the arbitrators bound to follow strct rules of law, especially where
these are uncertain..3 8
The arbitrators are given the power by statute to summon witnesses
and utilize the ordinary machinery of trial courts in order to produce
testimony.3 9 They may consider evidence not admissible according to
technical common law rules.140 They must give each party an oppor-
tunity to appear before them, present his case, and introduce evi-
dence. 41 It is not sufficient merely to permit each party to submit a
written statement of his position. 42  Furthermore, each party has the
right to be present when the other presents his case. ' Failure of the
arbitrators to observe these rules amounts to misconduct and renders
the award subject to exception. 4  The arbitrators must give their
personal attention to the evidence in deciding the dispute.145 If the
arbitrators fail to proceed promptly or refuse to proceed at all, they
are subject to certain statutory penalties,' 46 and can probably be com-
pelled to act with reasonable expedition by mandamus. 47  Where
three arbitrators- have qualified and later one withdraws, the two
remaining may proceed to an award in case the party whose arbitrator
has withdrawn refuses to appoint a successor. 48
The award should be signed and sealed up by the arbitrators and
delivered, together with a signed copy thereof, to the prevailing
party.149 It may be made by a majority of the arbitrators if this is
'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 422. See Dickte Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. L Eng.
Co., note 57, supra.
'"'Bacelder v. Wallace, note 121, supra.
'IBrow's Executors v. Farnandis, -7 Wash. 232, 67 Pac. 574 (1902).
'"'School District v. Sage, note 99, supra.
'1 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 426.
"School District v. Sage, note 99, supra; Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
But see Rem. Comp. Stat, § 427.
.41 McDonald v. Lews, 18 Wash. 300, 51 Paec. 387 (1897) Brown's Ex-
ecutors v. Farnandis, note 137, supra. See McCann v. Alaska Lumber Co.,
note 31, supra.
" Brown's Executors v. Farnandis, note 137, supra.
" Ibid.
'"Ibid.
"' Van Hook v. Burns, note 110, supra.
"'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 423.
"'Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. - Eng. Co., note 57, supra.
"' Ibid. See also American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. o. New Jersey Ins. Co.,
240 N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562 (1925).
"'Rem. Comp. Stat, § 422. See McCann v. Alaska Lumber Co., note 31,
supra.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
agreed upon between the parties. 5 ° The prevailing party should file
the original with the clerk of the Superior Court and serve the copy
upon the other.' If no exceptions are filed within twenty days there-
after, the prevailing party may have judgment entered.15 2
The jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the parties is obtained
by the act of the parties in entering into the agreement to arbitrate
which operates as a consent to its jurisdiction. 15 Consequently it is
not necessary to serve a copy of the award upon the losing party in
the manner provided for the serving of a summons.' 54  The agree-
ment to arbitrate also acts as a waiver of a jury so that if for any
reason the arbitration fails, the Superior Court proceeds with the case
without a jury 155
As errors of law or fact, in order to sustain exceptions to the award,
must appear from the face of the award,' 56 the refusal of arbitrators
to accept proof in support of an item or to allow an item, or the allow-
ance of an item not supported by proof, cannot be taken advantage of
by way of exception based upon error of law or fact unless these
matters appear from an examination of the award and submission;'1
but the failure of the arbitrators to decide one of the material matters
in dispute is sufficient ground for an exception. 58
Misbehavior in order to constitute sufficient ground for sustaining
an exception to an award must be based on an intent to do wrong." 9
A statement by arbitrators that they will not be bound by the evidence,
and the refusal of two of the arbitrators to listen to the third are not
sufficient to sustain an exception.' 6 But the arbitrators must be
sufficiently informed as to the dispute between the parties or the award
will not be sustained. 6' The court may set aside an award for bias
and prejudice. 1'6 2
.. Rem. Comp. Stat., § 4 .2 Bachelder v. Wallace, note 11, supra.
"'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 49.
" Ibid.
'"Dwfkte Mfgp. Co. v. Sound Const. 4- Eng. Co., note 57, supra, Mitsubishi
Goshz Kazsha v. Carstens Packing Co., note 110, supra.
"Mitsubishi, Goshz Kaisha v. Carstens Packing Co., note 110, supra.
"uDickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. Eng. Co., note 57, supra. See also
Berkovitz v. Arbib 4. Houlberg, note 42, supra.
Supra, pp. 95S-960.
.Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
"See McElroy v. Hooper note 106, supra.
" Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
"C0 Ibid.
. McDonald v. Lewis, note 141, supra.
... McCann v. Alaska Lumber Co., note 31, supra.
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Where an award is found to be defective, the court may refer the
matter back to the arbitrators with proper instructions.1 3  But if this
is impossible, as, for example, where an arbitrator has become disquali-
fied,"" the court will set aside the award and try the matter itself.16
An order setting aside an award is not appealable.16  Prejudice on
the part of the arbitrators and misconduct, and errors of law in the
award can only be taken advantage of on exceptions to the award and
by appeal from the judgment entered thereon.167
The action of the Superior Court following the filing of an award
is a special statutory proceeding and it is not necessary for the court to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law'0 "
At common law if the loser refused to pay an award, there is nothing
left for the prevailing party to do but bring an action upon it.'60 The
Washington Supreme Court has held that this right is "in express
terms swept away."' 70  It would seem to follow that the only way
to take advantage of an award is to file it and have judgment entered
in accordance with Remington's Compiled Statutes, Section 422. And
it has accordingly been held that an unfiled award is of no effect, and
will not bar an action in disregard of it.' 7 1  But an award made in
pursuance of common law arbitration in a state where common law
arbitration exists will be enforced in Washington and will sustain an
action brought upon it, and will also, even if not filed, act as a bar to
any action brought in disregard of it.'7 2
IV
CONCLUSION.
From the foregoing it will appear that arbitration is available to the
people of Washington as an effective method of settling their disputes.
"In re O'Rourke Bros, 36 Wash. Dec. 391, 940 Pac. 673 (1925).
1" Tacoma R. 4. M. Co. v. Cummings, note 45, supra.
1Ibut; Dickte Mfg. Co. -v. Sound Const. k. Eng. Co., note 57, supra.
'¢ Tacoma R. 4 M. Co. v. Cummings, note 45, supra.
16McElroy v. Hooper, note 106, supra; Dickto Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const.
B" ung. Co., note 57, supra.
C' Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
2 See Dickt Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. - Eng. Co., note 57, supra.
20 Ibid., 9 Wash. p. 319, 159 Pac. p. 131.
I Owen v. Casey, note 30, supra. But ia Barnes v. Spurck, note 73, supra,
where the action had apparently been brought upon the award, the court mdi-
cated no disapproval of such a procedure. The decision in the case, however,
made a discussion on this matter unnecessary.
11 Taylor a. Basye, note 30, supra.
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They may, when entering into a contract, include therein a clausel 3
providing that in case any dispute should arise out of the contract it
shall be submitted to arbitrators whose decision shall be final, and the
courts will enforce this agreement. Or, if a dispute has arisen which
promises years of expensive and burdensome litigation and the destruc-
tion of a valuable business relationship, they may agree to arbitrate
the matter before persons familiar with the subject-matter involved
and in whose fairness they have confidence and stipulate for an im-
mediate decision, thus settling the whole matter without great expense
and before the dispute has become so bitter as to make further business
relations between them impossible.
The arbitrators may be selected with particular reference to the
specific dispute which has arisen. Thus where trade customs or prac-
tices are in dispute, a board consisting of men familiar with the trade
in question may be chosen. Accountants may be named where compli-
cated accounts are involved ;174 engineers to settle engineering prob-
lems. Unlike judges and juries, such triers of disputes do not in addi-
tion to mastering the facts of the case in hand, have to crowd into a
few hurried days the acquisition of highly technical knowledge. Persons
who already have the requisite technical training may be selected. And
they can study the matter carefully, as there is no pressure from waiting
cases to coerce them into doing the best they can in a day or two in
order to get on with the docket. As they are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence applied in the courts, they can consider
anything having a bearing upon the matter in dispute and give it such
weight as they believe it entitled to.
The enactment of a new arbitration law in Washington, similar
to the acts now in effect in New York and New Jersey,' such as that
proposed by House Bill No. 168, is not necessary in order to make
arbitration a useful method of settling disputes. These modem acts
have but three distinctive features. First, the provision making executory
agreements to arbitrate valid, enforceable and irrevocable, second, the
"' See note 9, supra. See also the arbitration clauses involved in the fol-
lowing cases: Zindorf Const. Co. v. Western Am. Co., note 46, supra; Herring-
Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., note 52, supra, Jackson v. Walla
Walla, note 60, supra. But see the clauses involved in Gile v. Tsutakawa,
note 66, supra, and McNeT v. Captstran, note 68, supra.
1T4 CC Arbitrators are more competent to the settling of complicated
accounts than the officers of courts of law or equity" Lord Kenyon in Half-
hide v. Penning, note 19, supra.
... Notes 3, 4, supra.
'Note 11, supra.
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provision requiring that actions brought in disregard of such agree-
ments be stayed, and third, the provision allowing the institution of
proceedings to compel the other party to such an agreement to arbi-
trate. The first two of these provisions are now law in Washington
by judicial decision ;177 the third might well be adopted. The other
provisions of these acts merely set forth the details of the procedure to
be followed in obtaining an award and turning it into a judgment.
To adopt a complete act such as House Bill No. 168 would be to sub-
stitute a new and uncertain system of procedure for one which has
become well defined by judicial decision without any compensating
advantage. As most of these matters are questions, of procedure, 1 7
it would seem that any changes in the existing law which are found
advisable can be made by a few simple rules of court under the recently
enacted Washington statute giving complete rule-making power to
the Supreme Court.179
Judge Mackintosh stated in a recent case: '10
"It is persuasively argued by appellants' counsel that to
sanction arbitration awards made such as the one here is to
in Supra, pp. 248-054.
1The Washington arbitration statute was once a part of the Civil Practice
Act. See note 1-, supra.
" "An act to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits
and authorizing the Supreme Court to make rules relating to pleading, pro-
cedure and practice in the courts of this state," approved by the Governor
on January 12, 1926. See Paul, "The Rule-Malng Power of the Courts,"
1 WAsH. L. REV., 163, 9723.
The modern acts contain three provisions, the adoption of which would
probably be an improvement on the existing law-
First, the provision allowing either party to a contract containing an
arbitration clause to commence an action to compel the other to arbitrate.
With such a provision in effect one party to such an agreement may often be
able to have a dispute arbitrated which might otherwise become the subject
of litigation in a court which does not enforce arbitration agreements except
in an action for damages. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., note 1,
supra, in which case the Supreme Court upheld an order of a New York state
court directing the defendant to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a charter
party contaimng an arbitration clause.
Second, the provision authorizing the courts to fill any vacancies among
the arbitrators upon the application of either party. This may often enable
one party to an arbitration agreement to have a dispute settled by arbitration
although the other, in order to force the matter into court, refuses to appoint
an arbitrator as required by the agreement.
Third, the provision for determining at the outset in a summary fashion
all questions as to the validity of the contract containing the arbitration
agreement.
It might also be well to incorporate in a rule the suggestion made in
Hering-Hall-Marvm Safe Co. v. Purcell Safe Co., note 5, supra, that where
necessary in order to insure justice, the court might in a proceeding ancillary
to the arbitration proceedings make appropriate orders for preserving property
pending the termination of the arbitration proceedings.
" Hatch v. Cole, note 103, supra.
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give to arbitrators the power to arbitrarily decide the disputes.
That seems to have been the legislative intent, for by the
statute arbitrators are given the right to determine both the
law and their own method of finding the fact, and it was
with knowledge of that legal situation that the parties hereto
submitted their controversy to arbitration If it were
not so, and the courts were allowed to try these matters de
novo, the legislature would merely have added to the uncer-
tainty and delay of litigation instead of decreasing it, as was
their evident intention by providing for the informal and
speedy method of disposing of controversies."
As long as the Supreme Court retains this attitude, arbitration can
be depended upon as a prompt, inexpensive and effective method of
settling disputes.
Alfred N Heuston,
WNASHINGTOs, D. C.
